TSMC OIP 2026 展會專題版 · SECURE STORAGE ARCHITECTURETSMC OIP 2026 EVENT EDITION · SECURE STORAGE ARCHITECTURE

保護永久資料,
但不永久保存根金鑰
Protect permanent data
without permanently storing the root key

以 RP2350 公開案例界定實體接觸威脅模型,再由 SRAM PUF 根金鑰、AES-256 加密 OTP、位址混淆與安全控制器組成可防守的系統回應;所有尚待目標晶片證據釐清的限制同時保持可見。Use the public RP2350 case to define a physical-access threat model, then compose a defensible system response from an SRAM-PUF root, AES-256 encrypted OTP, address scrambling and a Secure Controller—while keeping every target-silicon evidence gap visible.

4整合功能INTEGRATED FUNCTIONS
8治理記錄GOVERNED RECORDS
7公開 TSMC OTP 節點PUBLISHED TSMC OTP NODES
2026-08-18證據截止日EVIDENCE CUT-OFF

摘要 · 實證收斂核心ABSTRACT · REFINED FOR EVIDENCE

問題是 persistent observability;
答案是分離 storage 與 secret
The problem is persistent observability;
the answer is storage–secret separation

RP2350 的公開結果顯示,permission、wrapper、fault detector 與 antifuse bit-cell opacity 都不能單獨成為最終防線。當 OTP bits 直接代表可用 root key、firmware secret 或 security configuration,成功 readout 的後果會非常接近完整 compromise。The public RP2350 results show that permissions, wrappers, fault detectors and assumed antifuse opacity cannot stand alone as the final barrier. When OTP bits directly encode a usable root key, firmware secret or security configuration, successful readout can approach full compromise.

Secure Storage 將 device-unique root 在上電時由 SRAM PUF 重建,以 AES-256 保護 OTP data,並用 address scrambling 與 Secure Controller 管理 mapping、provisioning、access 與 lifecycle。它的設計目標不是讓 OTP 永遠無法觀察,而是讓觀察結果停在 scrambled ciphertext。Secure Storage reconstructs a device-unique root from SRAM PUF behavior at power-up, protects OTP data with AES-256, and uses address scrambling plus a Secure Controller to govern mapping, provisioning, access and lifecycle. Its design goal is not to make OTP forever unobservable, but to make observation stop at scrambled ciphertext.

01 · 公開攻擊實證01 · PUBLIC ATTACK EVIDENCE

RP2350 用來界定
實體接觸威脅模型
RP2350 defines
a physical-access threat model

公開結果包含 voltage、laser、EM fault 與 FIB/PVC invasive analysis;這是控制與物理兩條平行 attack paths,不是所有 OTP 都會重現的單一因果鏈。它們支持同一條設計規則:memory-cell secrecy 不應是最後一道 confidentiality boundary。Public results include voltage, laser and EM faults plus FIB/PVC invasive analysis. These are parallel control and physical attack paths—not one causal chain that every OTP will reproduce. They support one design rule: memory-cell secrecy should not be the final confidentiality boundary.

Conceptual security laboratory showing parallel fault-injection and invasive-analysis paths
AI 生成概念視覺 · 多種攻擊路徑都必須收斂到可驗證的 system boundary;非實驗結果。AI-generated concept visual · Multiple attack paths must converge on a verifiable system boundary; not an experimental result.
控制層CONTROL

故障改變執行流或權限Fault changes execution or permissions

Boot path、guard read、wrapper 與 lock state 可能在 fault 下失去原先假設。Boot paths, guard reads, wrappers and lock states can lose their assumptions under fault.

物理層PHYSICAL

FIB/PVC 逼近位元單元狀態還原FIB/PVC approached cell-state recovery

公開結果讀出相鄰 bit pair 的 OR;完整逐 bit recovery 被認為原理上可能,但未被示範。The public result recovered the OR of adjacent bit pairs. Complete per-bit recovery was considered possible in principle, but was not demonstrated.

設計規則DESIGN RULE

實體讀出應止步於受保護資料Readout should end at protected data

只有在 encryption、scrambling、reconstruction、policy 與 lifecycle controls 都成立時,storage-state recovery 才應停在 protected data。Only when encryption, scrambling, reconstruction, policy and lifecycle controls all hold should storage-state recovery stop at protected data.

直接來源:Direct sources: Raspberry Pi challenge results ↗ · IOActive FIB/PVC analysis ↗

02 · 系統架構回應02 · SYSTEM RESPONSE

四個功能不是清單;
它們共同改變 attack consequence
Four functions are not a checklist;
together they change attack consequence

每一層只解決正確的問題:PUF 降低永久 key residency;AES 提供 confidentiality;scrambling 提高 mapping 成本;controller 約束 transaction 與 lifecycle。Each layer solves the right problem: PUF reduces permanent key residency; AES provides confidentiality; scrambling raises mapping cost; the controller constrains transactions and lifecycle.

Conceptual secure silicon at power-off without a stored reconstructed root
AI 生成概念視覺 · 核心設計狀態 · 在已驗證的 shutdown 條件下,不保留刻意儲存或 powered reconstructed root;ciphertext、helper material 與 transistor mismatch 仍可能存在。AI-generated concept visual · Core design state · Under validated shutdown conditions, no intentionally stored or powered reconstructed root remains; ciphertext, helper material and transistor mismatch may persist.
01SRAM PUF 根金鑰SRAM PUF ROOT

Root 不永久存放The root is not permanently stored

上電重建 device-unique root;runtime path、helper data 與 zeroization 仍須驗證。Reconstruct a device-unique root at power-up; runtime path, helper data and zeroization still require assurance.

02AES-256

密文成為持久狀態Ciphertext becomes the persistent state

真正的 confidentiality boundary;需要 FI/SCA 與 key-derivation evidence。The real confidentiality boundary; FI, SCA and key-derivation evidence remain required.

03位址擾亂ADDRESS SCRAMBLING

切斷 logical-to-physical mappingBreak the logical-to-physical map

增加 recovery 與 reconstruction 成本,但不取代 encryption。Raises recovery and reconstruction cost, but never replaces encryption.

04安全控制器SECURE CONTROLLER

約束可用明文的時間窗Bound the usable-plaintext window

管理 provisioning、APB access、error response、lifecycle 與 software contract。Governs provisioning, APB access, error response, lifecycle and the software contract.

組合系統推論COMPOSED SYSTEM INFERENCEOTP 讀出 → 混淆密文 ≠ 可用機密OTP readout → scrambled ciphertext ≠ usable secret

探索生命週期中的資料與驗證需求Explore Lifecycle Data and Evidence Needs

架構閱讀示例:不產生金鑰、不執行加密或寫入,也不代表已完成驗證。Architecture reading example: no key generation, encryption or writes, and no claim of completed validation.

持久資料區Persistent Data

OTP 密文OTP Ciphertext
Helper 資料Helper Data
生命週期中繼資料Lifecycle Metadata

在四個階段保留;完整性、版本與權限仍需查核。Retained across all four phases; check integrity, version and privileges.

Helper/中繼資料 → 重建政策;密文 → 授權引擎Helper / metadata → reconstruction policy; ciphertext → authorized engine

執行期路徑Runtime Path

PUF 製程差異PUF Process Variation物理差異持續存在Physical variation persists
重建暫存Reconstruction State回應、根與衍生金鑰Response, root and derived keys
授權引擎/緩衝區Authorized Engine / Buffers控制金鑰與明文出口Control key and plaintext release

斷電:不刻意維持重建金鑰;電源域與殘留狀態需驗證。Power-off: no intentionally retained reconstructed key; validate domains and remanence.

重建:暫時處理機密,先查核 helper 完整性與版本。Reconstruct: transient secrets; first check helper integrity and version.

存取:交易期間可能存在金鑰與明文;限制權限與存活時間。Access: keys and plaintext may exist during transactions; bound privileges and lifetime.

零化:清除暫存是目標,完成時序與中斷路徑需驗證。Zeroize: clearing volatile state is the goal; validate timing and interruption paths.

架構教學圖。色框表示目前閱讀重點;播放不是實體金鑰或密文操作,也不構成驗證結果。Architecture teaching diagram. Outlines mark the current reading focus; playback performs no key or ciphertext operation and is not a validation result.

持久資料Persistent data
執行中狀態Runtime state
所需證據Evidence needed
01 · 生命週期01 · LIFECYCLE

斷電靜態 → 上電重建 → 授權存取 → 零化銷毀Power-off → reconstruct → authorize → zeroize

Absent-at-rest 只處理永久 root target;runtime residency、reset interruption 與 zeroization 必須另行驗證。Absent-at-rest removes a persistent root target; runtime residency, reset interruption and zeroization still require separate evidence.

02 · 輔助資料02 · HELPER DATA

重建材料不是 root-key 備份Reconstruction material is not a root-key backup

公開 helper data 仍需要 leakage、integrity、replay、rollback 與 fault evidence。Public helper data still requires leakage, integrity, replay, rollback and fault evidence.

03 · 責任鏈03 · ACCOUNTABILITY

預先整合架構有助於減少跨 IP 交付斷層與邊界安全風險Pre-integration mitigates cross-IP hand-off and boundary security risks

Contractual ownership、qualification support 與 product-response scope 仍須在 target configuration 確認。Contractual ownership, qualification support and product-response scope must still be confirmed for the target configuration.

架構來源:Architecture source: Synopsys Secure Storage Solution ↗

03 · 實證檢驗門檻03 · EVIDENCE GATES

Architecture 是起點;
silicon evidence 才能形成 Results
Architecture is the start;
silicon evidence creates Results

OIP 報告應把結果分為 public evidence、vendor disclosure、system inference 與 validation gap;不要把設計意圖寫成完成驗證。The OIP report should separate public evidence, vendor disclosure, system inference and validation gaps; design intent must not masquerade as completed validation.

Conceptual reconstruction of a device-unique root from SRAM PUF response and helper data
AI 生成概念視覺 · Helper data 支援重建,但不應等同 root secret;其 leakage、integrity 與 lifecycle 仍須驗證。AI-generated concept visual · Helper data supports reconstruction but is not the root secret; leakage, integrity and lifecycle still require verification.
互動晶片實驗室 · PUF 金鑰重建與誤碼極限 INTERACTIVE LAB · SRAM PUF RECONSTRUCTION BOUNDS

SRAM PUF 原生誤碼率 (BER) 與 BCH 輔助資料校驗邊界模擬器 SRAM PUF Native BER & BCH Helper Data Syndrome Simulator

教學試算 · 等待計算Illustrative Estimate · Pending Calculation

教學模型 2026-10-08:BER 基準 3.8%、溫度係數 0.45、老化係數 0.012、每單元最小熵 0.82 bit 皆為既有假設,非產品規格或量測。BCH 以 n=128、k≈128−7t 及獨立誤碼近似;t≥19 超出此簡化模型,保留輸入並顯示無法試算。FER 比較門檻 10⁻⁶/10⁻³ 不是 AEC-Q100 或密碼安全認證;機率數值下限 10⁻¹⁵ 為顯示截斷。HKDF 不會增加原有熵,實際碼、誤碼相關性與洩漏須另驗證。Illustrative model 2026-10-08: baseline BER 3.8%, temperature coefficient 0.45, aging coefficient 0.012 and 0.82 bit min-entropy per cell are existing assumptions, not product specifications or measurements. BCH uses n=128, k≈128−7t and independent errors; t≥19 is outside this approximation, so the input remains available with no estimate. FER thresholds 10⁻⁶/10⁻³ are not AEC-Q100 or cryptographic certification; 10⁻¹⁵ is a display floor. HKDF does not increase entropy; validate the actual code, error correlation and leakage.

操作接面結溫 (Junction Temp):JUNCTION TEMP (Tj): 25 °C
NBTI/PBTI 老化時間 (Aging):NBTI/PBTI AGING: 0 Yrs
BCH 容錯更正力 (Capability t):BCH CAPACITY (t / 128b): 12 bits / 128b
原生誤碼率 (BER)NATIVE BER
—
金鑰重建失敗率 (FER)KEY FAILURE (FER)
—
輔助資料儲存需求HELPER DATA SIZE
—
殘餘最小熵 (Min-Entropy)RESIDUAL ENTROPY
—
待依所選條件試算;不代表產品規格或資格驗證。Estimate pending for the selected assumptions; not product specifications or qualification.
直接觀測實證DIRECT OBSERVATION

RP2350 實體攻擊實證 (FIB/PVC)RP2350 attack evidence

公開案例支持威脅模型與問題重要性。Public cases support the threat model and urgency.

供應商揭露VENDOR DISCLOSURE

架構與先進製程節點規格主張Architecture & node claims

產品頁支持功能、AES-256、PUF root、APB 與 OTP node availability。Product pages support functions, AES-256, PUF root, APB and OTP node availability.

驗證缺口VALIDATION GAP

第三方實作驗證與安全認證證據Implementation and Assurance Evidence

PVT 邊界單元篩選、高低溫 Aging、LFI/Glitch 故障注入、DPA/CPA 功耗側信道衰減、頂層主動金屬屏蔽、單週期 Zeroization、以及 NIST SP 800-90B/208 與 CC AVA_VAN.5 證據鏈尚需具體封閉。Extreme-PVT marginal cells, thermal aging, LFI/glitch injection, DPA/CPA attenuation, active top-metal shield, single-cycle zeroization, and formal evidence chains (NIST SP 800-90B/208, CC AVA_VAN.5) must still close for the target configuration.

有界推論BOUNDED INFERENCE

可防守的現階段結論The defensible conclusion today

此 architecture 合理地把 OTP physical recovery 與 usable-secret recovery 分離;但特定產品的 resistance、certification 與 residual risk 必須以 target implementation evidence 確認。The architecture credibly separates physical OTP recovery from usable-secret recovery; resistance, certification and residual risk for a specific product require target-implementation evidence.

節點來源:Node source: Synopsys OTP platform evidence ↗

04 · OIP 共同決策04 · OIP DECISION

把報告從 solution pitch,
收斂成共同 evidence plan
Move beyond a solution pitch;
align on a shared evidence plan

TSMC OIP 的價值不是只列 N5/N3,而是把 exact macro、node、integration boundary 與 assurance deliverables 對齊。The OIP value is not simply listing N5/N3; it is aligning the exact macro, node, integration boundary and assurance deliverables.

目標平台PLATFORM

確認 target configurationConfirm the target configuration

Node · OTP macro · capacity · read mode · qualification · Secure Storage release status

系統整合INTEGRATION

封閉 SoC boundaryClose the SoC boundary

Power/reset · APB privilege · DFT/debug · provisioning · firmware API · lifecycle

安全保證ASSURANCE

定義 evidence acceptanceDefine evidence acceptance

FI · SCA · invasive · PVT/aging · zeroization · residual risk · report owner

建議簡報結尾:Recommended close: 同意 target node 與 configuration 的 evidence closure plan,而不是宣稱所有攻擊已被消除。Agree the evidence-closure plan for the target node and configuration—rather than claiming every physical attack has been eliminated.

05 · 3D CHIPLET 異質整合05 · 3D CHIPLET INTEGRATION

3D Chiplet / 2.5D CoWoS 異質整合
eNVM 微凸塊 RC 延遲與熱機械應力模擬器
3D Chiplet & 2.5D CoWoS Heterogeneous Integration
eNVM Parasitic RC & Thermal-Mechanical Stress Simulator

基於熱機械切應力模型 (CTE 失配剪切)、Cu-Cu 混合鍵合與微凸塊寄生 RC 讀取延遲、以及頂層 300W 高算力晶粒引發之垂直熱阻堆疊效應,評估 TSMC SoIC、CoWoS-S 與 Foveros 架構下 eNVM 物理可行性。 Modeling of interface shear stress from CTE mismatch, Cu-Cu hybrid bonding / micro-bump parasitic RC read latency, and thermal stacking hotspots under 300W compute dies across TSMC SoIC, CoWoS-S, and Foveros architectures.

與安全儲存的關係:重建金鑰與 OTP 存取可能跨晶粒,互連延遲、熱環境與供電/重設會影響生命週期整合。本模型保留封裝情境作為問題探索;選擇 SoIC、CoWoS 或 Foveros 預設不代表具名產品規格、代工廠認可或安全資格。封裝試算不能替代 PUF、控制器與目標晶片的驗證。Relation to secure storage: key reconstruction and OTP access may cross dies, so interconnect latency, temperature and power/reset affect lifecycle integration. Packaging presets remain for exploration; selecting SoIC, CoWoS or Foveros does not establish named-product specifications, foundry approval or security qualification. Packaging estimates do not replace PUF, controller or target-silicon validation.

⚠️ 示意模擬模型與技術邊界說明:⚠️ Schematic Model & Technical Boundary Notice: 本工作台之 CTE 熱失配剪切應力、微凸塊寄生 RC 讀取延遲與垂直熱阻估算為基於一階解析力學與熱流公式之數值示意模型,非代工廠或 OSAT 認證之簽核規範。真實 3D 封裝晶粒可靠度受底部填膠 (Underfill) 流動性、焊點共平面度及完整 3D 有限元素 (FEA) 模擬檢驗判定。 The CTE mismatch shear stress, micro-bump parasitic RC delay, and vertical thermal resistance in this workbench are schematic numerical models based on first-order analytical mechanics, rather than official foundry or OSAT sign-off specifications. Physical 3D chiplet reliability depends on underfill flow integrity, bump coplanarity, and full 3D FEA thermomechanical simulation.
頂層算力晶粒熱功耗Compute Die Power 120 W
D2D 互連走線長度D2D Trace Length 3.5 mm
熱循環溫差 ΔTThermal Delta ΔT ΔT = 110°C
接面總溫升 TjJunction Temp Tj
68.2 °C
界面剪切應力 τShear Stress τ
84.5 MPa
端到端讀取延遲Read Latency
5.12 ns
異質整合綜合評分Packaging Score
92 / 100

3D 封裝第一性原理物理曲線 (Packaging Profile) 3D Packaging Physical Profiles

Loading packaging telemetry...
OIP 安全儲存核心論述OIP SECURE STORAGE THESIS

保護永久資料,
但不永久保存根金鑰
Protect permanent data
without permanently storing the root key

以架構確立隔離,以證據建立保證。Architecture establishes the separation. Evidence establishes the assurance.